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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of trust in the performance of the 
sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland. The study utilized perceptions of 124 
smallholder cane growers in the sugar industry in Swaziland. Items presented in a 
Likert type scale were used to measure cane growers’ trust in the millers. Descriptive 
statistics involving cross tabulation were used to determine the impact of trust on the 
performance of the cane growers, which in turn has an influence on the performance of 
the whole sugar chain. The results indicate that farmers who have trust in the millers 
perform better than those without trust, and hence they contribute to the performance 
of the whole chain, in terms of more and good quality sugarcane supplied to the mill. 
This implies more sugar production and increased income to the industry as a whole. 
The results imply that a relationship founded on trust and mutual respect is more 
likely to succeed than a relationship of convenience supported by legal contingencies. 
Therefore, there is a need for honesty, fairness and absence of opportunistic behaviour 




In business practice, firms frequently make deliberate attempts to establish 
stronger relationships with suppliers and customers. Many firms are moving 
away from traditional “arm’s length” business relationships and are forging 
closer and more collaborative ties with supply chain partners as a way to 
reduce costs, increase efficiency, improve quality, and enhancing competitive 
advantage. Spekman (1988:75) argues that “competition from offshore 
producers, technological innovations, and shortened product life cycles have 
changed buyer-seller relationships. Traditional arms length contractual 
relationships no longer suffice, but closer collaborative approaches are 
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needed”. Anderson and Weitz (1989) argue that the development of inter-
organisational relationships is an approach that combines the advantages of 
vertically integrated distribution systems (control, coordination and 
information processing) with the advantages of systems utilising independent 
chain participants (flexibility, scale economies, efficiency and low overheads). 
However, inter-organisational relationships come with associated costs and 
risks. Smallholder farmers like those in the sugar industry are generally 
considered to be dependent and vulnerable in such relationships because of 
significant resource inequalities, opportunism and the abuse of asymmetric 
power advantages to expropriate proprietary assets and obtain concessions 
from the other partner (Williamson, 1985).  
 
The use of contracts to govern transactions between supply chain partners 
limits the behaviour of the parties substantially, by reducing their flexibility 
and not allowing them to benefit from market changes. This study proposes 
that the development of relational exchange between supply chain 
participants is an appropriate strategy for smallholder farmers. This is even 
more rewarding when undertaken under appropriate facilitating conditions. 
These can be created by social control mechanisms like trust and cooperation. 
The purpose of this article is to investigate the role of trust in the performance 
of the sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland. A supply chain is 
conceptualised as a series of connected activities concerned with planning, 
coordinating and controlling the production of sugar, starting with the 
production of sugarcane by farmers, through processing by the millers and 
finally to the consumer. Thus it can be broken down into units, beginning 
with the cane growers who provide sugarcane to millers, who then process it 
into sugar and pass it on to the Swaziland Sugar Association, which then 
markets it on behalf of both farmers and the millers.  
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
theoretical and conceptual framework by reviewing the literature on trust and 
exchange relationships. Section 3 presents the study objectives, while Section 4 
presents the data collection and methods. The results of the study are 
discussed in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 provides the conclusions and 
managerial implications drawn from this study. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1  The concept of trust 
 
Trust is considered to exist if one party believes that the other party is honest 
or benevolent (Doney & Cannon, 1997). It is the expectation that attenuates 
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the suspicion that one party in the transaction will behave opportunistically 
(Gulati, 1995; Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Thus, if trust exists in a relational 
contract, the contracting parties will be convinced that they will not be victims 
of behaviour such as adverse selection, moral risk, hold-up or any type of 
contractual hazard. 
 
Sako (1998) identified three types of trust. These include contractual trust, 
competence trust and goodwill trust. Contractual trust rests on a shared moral 
norm of honesty and promise keeping, while competence trust requires a 
shared understanding of professional conduct, technical and managerial 
standards. Goodwill trust can exist when there is consensus on the principle 
of fairness. She argues that there is a hierarchy of trust whereby fulfilling a 
minimum set of obligations constitutes contractual trust, while honouring a 
broader set constitutes goodwill trust. Therefore, a movement from 
contractual trust to goodwill trust involves a gradual expansion in the 
congruence of beliefs about what is acceptable behaviour. Other types of trust 
are described by Faulkner, 1995; Gulati, 1995 and Medina-Munoz and 
Medina-Munoz, 2002. 
 
2.2  Sources of trust 
 
Humphery and Schmitz (1998) identified three sources of trust, namely 
institution-based trust, meso-level characteristic-based trust, and processed-
based trust. Institutional based trust involves the use of institutional factors 
that can act as support for trust. It is generated by confidence in the ‘formal 
structures’ of society and more importantly in their ability to impose sanctions 
when trust is breached (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Humphery & Schmitz, 1998). 
Examples of institution-based trust include the legal system and trade 
associations. Meso-level characteristic-based trust is trust based on the 
characteristics or reputation of the transacting parties. Here group 
membership serves as an indication of trustworthiness, as is reputation. Trust 
derived from experience of co-operative interaction is referred to as 
processed-based trust. This form of inter-firm trust is built incrementally as 
firms repeatedly interact (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). 
 
2.3  Trust as an economic asset 
 
Generally, an asset is a resource that creates benefits for a firm while the value 
of an asset is measurable and it loses value (depreciates) over time. Assets also 
have an opportunity cost and can complement or substitute for one another 
(Wilson & Kennedy, 1999). Welsch et al ( 1 9 7 6 )  a s  q u o t e d  b y  W i l s o n  a n d  
Kennedy (1999) argue that even unidentifiable intangible assets such as 
  149Agrekon, Vol 43, No 2 (June 2004)  Masuku & Kirsten 
 
 
goodwill can be purchased, amortized, and sold. They point at reputation as 
one determinant of goodwill. Such reputation may be valued with other 
contributors to goodwill as the present value of the expected future earnings 
of the firm. Dasgupta (1988) uses game theory to illustrate the economic value 
of trust. He argues that trustworthiness is similar to other assets such as 
knowledge and information. Trust is of economic value because it allows 
agents to initiate and maintain cooperation without safeguards (Lorenzen, 
1998).  
 
Trust is considered to be of economic value when it is based on non-
contractual, rather than contractual mechanisms. Non-contractual trust such 
as goodwill eliminates the need for formal contracts, which are costly to write, 
monitor, and enforce (Dyer, 1997) and thus it reduces transaction costs. For 
example, in conditions of high trust, transactors spend less time and resources 
on ex-ante contracting because they trust that the pay-off will be divided 
fairly. Thus, there is no need for future contingencies (Dyer, 1997). Trusting 
parties spend less time and resources on monitoring to see if the other party is 
not shirking or is fulfilling the spirit of the agreement. This is because parties 
have confidence that each party will not take advantage of the other even 
when there is a chance to do so. In addition to reducing transaction costs, trust 
also enable participants in an exchange relationship to share important 
confidential information and encourage them to make relationship-specific 
investments, which in turn enhances productivity in the exchange relationship 
without fear of opportunism (Parkhe, 1993; Dyer, 1997). 
 
2.4  Trust as a governance mechanism 
 
Recently, it has been recognised that the role of trust goes beyond just 
complementing incomplete contracts, but that it can actually play an effective 
role as a governance mechanism (Sako, 1998). Macaulay (1963) introduced an 
alternative view to the neoclassical theory of contracts. He maintains that the 
importance of law in contractual relations has been vastly overstated and he 
argues that economic agents construct productive relationships mainly 
without reference to the legal system (MacNeil, 1985). They use a variety of 
purely private mechanisms such as personal trust, calculative trust, reputation 
and constructed mutual dependence. The main issue between the relationship 
governance through legal institutions and trust lies in the relative roles of 
trust and law in promoting cooperation (Deakin, Lane & Wilkinson, 1997). 
 
Sociologists such as Grief (1996) and Granovetter (1985) argue that 
relationships are embedded in a broader social structure. Therefore, social or 
network relations affect the nature of interactions between traders and they 
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provide powerful enforcement mechanisms when a potential for dispute 
exists (Galanter, 1974). The classical contract law argues for comprehensive 
contracting, in which society is regarded as being composed of isolated, self-
interested individuals and only contract law supplies the needed glue to hold 
individuals to their bargains (Macaulay, 1963). However, this kind of 
contracting is an unrealistic description of relationships as well as the legal 
practice of contract. This is because businesses rarely resort to legal remedies 
and even when they do, they find that contract law is not interpreted 
according to classical law principles, which assume that parties structure 
complex contracts and rely upon legal rules, standards, and remedies implied 
in the law to protect themselves against opportunism. This has since led to the 
challenge of classical contract law by several sociologists, for example, Lewis 
and Weigert (1985) and Campbell and Harris (1993). MacNeil (1980) argues 
that the classical law of contract views exchange as discrete one-time event, 
whereas many modern exchanges involve more complex association. The 
practice in commercial exchange is that trusting and cooperative relations are 
the norms because the majority of businesses do not engage in “single games” 
(Antle, 1984) or in discrete contracting (Macaulay, 1963). Therefore, such 
norms are also considered when there are disputes between exchange 
partners.  
 
2.5  Trust and supply chain performance 
 
Several empirical studies which acknowledge the contribution of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) to supply chain relation, suggest that the main 
factors influencing efficiency in supply chain include informal elements. Such 
as trust, norms or standards that support exchange relations irrespective of 
contractual obligations, and authority relations that are exerted throughout 
the supply chain by those who have superior power in relation to the market 
or information (Cullen & Hickman, 2001). Ramdas and Spekman (2000) used 
six variables that reflect different approaches to measuring supply chain 
performance. These included inventory, time, order fulfilment, quality, 
customer focus, and customer satisfaction. Their results indicate that authority 
balance is positively related to alliance performance. The more one partner 
controls the alliance through authority advantage, the greater the likelihood 
that the alliance would perform poorly. The interaction between trust and 
authority shows that the existence of trust affects the relationship between 
authority balance and performance. In the case of the relationship between 
authority balance and performance, it is shown that trust dampens the 
positive relationship. So, for example, trust and authority balance serve 
somewhat as proxies for each other in the prediction of relationship 
performance. Where a firm can trust its partner, the balancing of authority is 
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not as critical for enhancing performance. Teegen and Doh (2002) concurring 
with Ramdas and Spekman (2000) conclude that trusting relationships are 
perceived to promote alliance performance and that the presence of authority 
advantage has a negative effect on alliance performance, which is further 
worsened by the absence of trust.  
 
Milford (2002), in a study of the state of the value chain in the Australian 
sugar industry, found that millers perceive the level of trust between millers 
and growers to be better than the perceptions of growers and harvesters. 
Milford attributed the perception of lack of trust by growers and harvesters to 
the poor performance of the industry in the past, individualism on growers’ 
part and perceived power and information imbalances. Relatedly a study by 
Medina-Munoz and Medina-Munoz (2002) on the role of trust in inter-
organisational relationships’ control and success found that all the different 
types of trust used in the analysis were positive and significantly associated 
with the success of the relationship between tour operators and 
accommodation companies. This suggests that trust is associated with the 
success of the relationship. 
 
Tregurtha and Vink (1999), in a study of trust and supply chain relationships 
using a case study of the South African Breweries (SAB) and the Taung barley 
project, found that the efficiency of barley production in Taung determined 
whether the trust relationship between the farmers and SAB would continue. 
They argue that trust cannot make an economically bad relationship good, but 
it can make a good relationship better. SAB emphasised that sound economic 
principles determine the long-term future of their involvement with the 
farmers. Similarly, the small-scale farmers who are involved in this supply 
chain indicated that they would only continue to produce barley as long as it 
represented the most profitable allocation of their resources, subject to their 
low risk preference. They pointed out that the trust alliance they have with 
SAB raises their net profit margin because it reduces their transaction costs. 
However, the scope for cost reduction is limited and cannot compensate for 
inefficient resource use. These findings i m p l y  t h a t  t r u s t  i s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
benefits the individuals realise in the relationship. However, the study was 
qualitative in nature, hence it lacked a measure of the quantitative importance 
of trust in the relationship. 
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) argue that trust and commitment are important 
factors if a company is going to succeed with its relationship marketing. They 
conclude that trust is positively affected by shared values and communication 
among supply chain partners, but negatively affected by the presence of 
opportunistic behaviour. They viewed shared values as the extent to which 
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the trusting parties’ goals, behaviour and way of work are congruent. In their 
view, communication is the extent to which information is shared between the 
parties, whereas opportunistic behaviour refers to the degree at which parties 
seek individual gain. Morgan and Hunt’s results correspond to their model. 
They found that the presence of trust in a relationship has a positive effect on 
commitment, cooperation and functional conflict, and a negative effect on 
uncertainty. Considering Morgan and Hunt’s findings, it is clear that they 
were dealing with relational trust. 
 
A study by Moore (1998) aimed at understanding the importance of relations 
within logistic alliances also studied the concept of trust in relationships. The 
study assumed that equity is important for the development of trust, where 
equity implies the sharing of benefits and burdens. This assumption that 
equity is an important factor for the creation of trust was supported by 
Moore’s empirical findings. 
 
Doney and Cannon (1997) examined how trust emerges and the impact of 
trust on buying behaviour in business-to-business relationships. Two kinds of 
trust were studied and they involved trust between the customer and the 
selling company as a whole and trust between the customer and front-line 
employees of the selling company. Doney and Cannon assumed that 
customers that trust companies as a whole are dependent on calculus factors 
such as the selling company’s image and size. The logic to trust front-line 
personnel is different for different customers. Therefore, trust in this context 
depends on emotional factors such as social contact, similarity between parties 
and mutual affections, but also on harder factors like power and expertise. 
 
Scholars in chain relationships increasingly acknowledge the role of 
interpersonal factors such as trust on inter-firm outcomes. Larson (1992), 
studying the governance of exchange relationships found that personal 
relationships and reputations, coupled with knowledge of the firm’s skills and 
capabilities, shape the context of new exchanges between firms by reducing 
risks and uncertainties about the motives and intentions of the other firm. 
Several studies suggest that interpersonal trust operates in an independent, 
yet complementary manner to many organisational variables (Andaleeb, 1992; 
Anderson & Narus, 1990). For example, it facilitates relational processes such 
as collaboration and relational norms, but has limited impact on performance 
(Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpande, 1992). However, empirical results suggest 
that interpersonal trust is capable of safeguarding joint competitive 
advantages against varying levels of ex-post opportunism. Thus, adverse 
effect of opportunism suspicions may be limited to less tangible relational 
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This study is concerned with the relationship of smallholder cane growers and 
the millers in the sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland. It attempts to 
identify and analyse the importance of relational factors in the performance of 
supply chains. The study focuses on the role of trust on the performance of the 
exchange relationship of smallholder cane growers and the millers in the 
sugar industry supply chain in Swaziland and hence the performance of the 
whole supply chain. 
 
4.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
The study used data collected in 2001 from a sample of 124 smallholder cane 
growers who supply sugarcane to the three sugar mills in Swaziland 
(Simunye, Ubombo (Bigbend) and Mhlume) and with a maximum land size of 
100ha per farmer. In addition to individual farmers, the respondents included 
representatives of farmers’ association. Data were collected by means of 
personal interviews using a structured 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 was 
equal to strongly disagree and 4 equal to strongly agree (see Appendix A for 
items used to measure trust). 
  
The most important criterion in selecting a sample is to increase the validity of 
the collected data (Carmines & Zeller, 1988). In this study the data selection 
criterion was designed to increase validity, rather than to ensure that the 
sample was representative of the given population. Therefore, the study used 
purposive sampling, which is most desirable when certain important 
segments of the target population are intentionally represented in the sample. 
The sample incorporated 10% of members from those farmer associations with 
farmers operating individually. A farmer was only interviewed if he/she had 
sold sugarcane to the mill at least once. Those farmers who had not yet sold 
sugarcane to the mill were not included in the sample. Purposive sampling is 
a deliberate non-random method of sampling, which aims to sample a group 
of people or settings with a particular characteristic such as where they live in 
society, or specific cultural knowledge. The power of purposive sampling lies 
in selecting information-rich cases for study, where information-rich cases i.e. 
those that provide a great deal of insight into the issues of central importance 
to the research (Patton, 1990). 
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5. RESULTS  AND  DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Farmers’ trust and perceptions of their relationship with millers  
 
Trust is regarded as an important asset in an exchange relationship between 
supply chain members like the cane growers and millers. Its importance is 
rooted in the belief that it leads to desirable attitudes of commitment and that 
it reduces transaction costs associated with monitoring and providing 
safeguards in an exchange relationship. 
 
Table 1 compares the perceptions of the farmers who trust the millers and 
those who do not trust them. The results indicate that almost all respondents 
who trust the millers (98.6%) and those who do not trust the millers (98.1%) 
are certain about their relationship with the millers. Almost all respondents 
who do not trust the millers (96.2%) and all those who trust the millers (100%) 
indicated their commitment to their relationship with the millers. The 
perception by farmers of lack of cooperation by the millers is evident in both 
farmers who trust as well as those who do not trust the millers. More than 
three-quarters (84.9%) of the farmers who do not trust millers and about two-
thirds (62.0%) of those who trust millers expressed a perceived lack of 
cooperation in their relationship with the millers. Both farmers who trust and 
those who do not trust millers perceived dependence on the millers. More 
than half (56.6%) of the respondents without trust and more than three-
quarters (77.5%) of those who trust perceive that farmers are dependent on 
the millers. The results also suggest that more than three-quarters (88.7%) of 
farmers who do not trust the millers and 77.5% of those who trust millers feel 
that farmers are influenced by millers. About ninety percent (90.6%) of those 
farmers who do not trust millers and 59.2% of those who trust them, perceive 
that millers exercise opportunistic behaviour towards farmers. The majority of 
those who trust (91.5%) and those who do not trust millers (64.2%) are 
satisfied in their relationship with the millers. 
 
Collectively, the results suggest that more of those farmers who trust millers 
than those who do not trust are certain of their relationship with millers, are 
committed to the relationship, are dependent on the millers and are satisfied 
with their relationship with the millers. On the other hand, more of those 
farmers who do not trust millers than those who trust them perceive that 
there is no cooperation between farmers and millers, farmers are influenced 
by millers, and that millers behave opportunistically. The results show the 
importance of trust in an exchange relationship. 
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It is a common phenomenon that the element of trust in relationships is linked 
to economic benefits. In most cases people who realize economic benefits in 
their relationship are likely to have developed trust in that relationship. Table 
2 presents the results of the respondents who trust millers and those who do 
not trust  millers with their perceptions on profit. The results show that nearly 
all the farmers (94.2%) who trust the millers have indicated that they make a 
profit from the sale of sugarcane. About three quarters (72.3%) of those who 
do not trust the millers also indicated that they make a profit. The results 
suggest that both farmers who trust and those who do not trust the millers 
realize economic benefits from their relationship with the millers. However, 
more of those who trust millers compared to those who do not trust them 
indicated that they make a profit in sugarcane production. This indicates the 
importance of trust in enhancing economic benefits. 
 




















5.2  Farmers’ trust and duration of relationship with millers 
 
Normally the level of trust between exchange partners is expected to improve 
with time, especially processed based trust as a result of continued 
cooperative interaction. Therefore, the level of trust in a relationship is 
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expected to be higher as the period of relationship engagement increases. 
However, the results in Table 3  show a negative relationship between the 
number of years in the farmers’ exchange relationship and their trust in the 
millers. More than half (57.7%) of the farmers who trust millers have less than 
10 years in sugarcane farming, while 61.2% of those who do not trust millers 
have more than 10 years in sugarcane farming. This could be attributed to 
unpleasant experiences of these farmers with millers in the past, such as 
uneven distribution of proceeds from the sugar industry. It should be noted 
that whist it can take time for individuals to develop trust, the same trust may 
be lost within a short time if the other person in the exchange show signs of 
untrustworthiness and opportunistic behaviour, which may be the case with 
the farmers and the millers. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
It may be argued that organisations establish more straightforward, lasting 
and confidential relationships if they have constructed formal institutionalised 
procedures to further their cooperation. However, it is important to note that 
a contract works on compliance, while relational exchange requires trust and 
commitment. A relationship founded on trust, mutual respect is more likely to 
succeed than a relationship of convenience supported by legal contingencies. 
Therefore, relationships characterised by trust between smallholder cane 
growers and millers is more important for mutual benefit and good quality 
relationship. The results in this study support previous studies, which 
advocate for relational contracting in agricultural supply chains. This study 
has shown that trust is important in enhancing the performance of members 
of a supply chain, and hence the whole supply chain. 
 
Both smallholder cane growers and millers need to understand that trust 
cannot be created easily. It is not a simple factor that can be regarded as 
separate from other preconditions of an exchange. Therefore, there is a need 
for (1) directness (openness, honest and effective communication and 
providing explanations and justifications for actions); (2) continuity 
(frequency of communication, taking time to explain and investing time in the 
relationship); (3) multiplexity (understanding each party, their roles and 
responsibilities); (4) parity (fairness, impartiality, not acting opportunistically, 
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integrity, good intentions and honouring promises); and (5) common interests 
and diversity (shared values, purpose and vision, setting expectations, 
successful handling of problems, reconciliation). Overall, the smallholder cane 
growers and millers need to practice fairness, have integrity, ensure effective 
communication, have commitment and shared purpose or values which are 
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Table A1:  Items measuring trust 
1.  The mill’s decisions are meant to benefit both growers and the mill (trust1) 
2.  The mill treats cane growers with care (trust2) 
3.  There is a mutual understanding between the mill and the cane growers (trust3) 
4.  The mill can be relied upon for its technical ability (trust4) 
5.  The mill sometimes withholds some information that may be useful to cane growers (trust5R) (R) 
6.  The mill cheats on farmers (trust6R) (R) 
7.  One has to monitor and double check whatever information the mill gives to cane growers 
(trust7R) (R) 
8.  You sometimes think of quitting sugarcane farming (Rpleave1) (R) 
9.  The way farmers are treated by the mill one thinks of changing the mill (Rpleave2) (R) 
R =  reversed coding (The responses to these items were reversed before the analysis was conducted,  
i.e. responses such as 1 and 4 were switched over, and 2 and 3 were also switched over). 
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